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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack
Availability requires that computer systems function normally without loss of resources
to legitimate users. One of the most challenging issues to availability is Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attack [1, 2, 3, 4]. The DoS threat started to materialize in the Internet with
the massive attack against the University of Minnesota in 1999 [5]. The access links
of the university were flooded by packets launched from many machines, the links were
completely hogged up by the attack packets, and legitimate (non-attack) packets were
dropped. Since then, many DoS attacks have been and continue to be launched [6].
According to the World Wide Web (WWW) Douligeris FAQ [7], a DoS attack can be
described as an attack designed to render a computer or a network incapable of providing
normal services. This kind of attack aims at rendering a network incapable of providing
normal service by targeting either the networks bandwidth or its connectivity. These
attacks achieve their goal by sending at a victim a stream of packets that swamps his
network or processing capacity denying access to his regular clients.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks add the many-to-one dimension to the
DDoS problem, making the prevention and mitigation of such attacks more difficult and
the impact proportionally severe. A DDoS attack uses many computers to launch a
coordinated DoS attack against one or more targets. The DDoS attack is the most
1
Figure 1.1: Architecture of DDoS attack.
advanced form of DoS attacks. It is distinguished from other attacks by its ability to
deploy its weapons in a distributed way over the Internet and to aggregate these forces
to create lethal traffic [4]. In a typical DDoS attack, the malicious client (attacker) first
compromises relay hosts (masters), which in turn compromise attack machines (agents)
as illustrated in Fig.1.1. The attack begin when the attacker sends an attack command
to the masters through a secure channel to launch an attack against the targeted victim.
The attack traffic is usually so aggregated that it is difficult to distinguish legitimate
packets from attack packets. Also, there are no apparent characteristics of DDoS attack
streams that could be directly used for their detection and filtering.
The DDoS attacks can are carried out at the network-layer or the application-layer.
The network-layer DDoS attacks like ICMP flooding, SYN flooding and UDP flooding
aim to consume the network bandwidth and deny service to legitimate users of the victim
system. When network-layer DDoS attacks fail, attackers shift their offensive strategies
to application-layer attacks and establish a more sophisticated type of DDoS attacks.
The attackers attack the victim web servers by HTTP GET requests and pulling large
image files from the victim server in overwhelming numbers. The MYDoom worm and
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the CyberSlam are all types of this type attack.
1.2 DDoS Defense Mechanisms
The seriousness of the DDoS problem and the increased frequency of DDoS attacks have
led to the advent of numerous DDoS defense mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms
address a network-layer DDoS attack such as SYN flooding attacks. Other approaches
attempt to solve the DDoS problem on Web servers or authentication servers.
The designing of DDoS defense mechanisms faces two main challenges: technical chal-
lenges and social challenges. Technical challenges encompass problems associated with
the current Internet protocols and characteristics of the DDoS threat. Social challenges,
on the other hand, largely pertain to the manner in which a successful technical solution
will be introduced to Internet users, and accepted and widely deployed by these users.
Over the past several years, many defense mechanisms have been proposed to defend
DDoS attacks. DDoS defense approaches can be classified into prevention, detection,
response and mitigation. Mirkovic et al. presented an extensive taxonomy of DoS attack
and defense techniques [3].
1.2.1 Intrusion prevention
Intrusion prevention is one of the most effective defense approaches for DDoS attacks
which aims to filter and drop attack packets, so it can stop attacks before they can reach
their target. Spoofing prevention approaches assume that the source address of attack
traffic is spoofed, which is true in many situations since attackers need spoofed traffic to
hide the real source of the attack traffic and exploit protocol vulnerabilities. Recently,
some spoofing prevention mechanisms focused on preventing particular attack methods,
such as anti-spoofing mechanisms [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] by enforcing rules that make
these attack methods impossible or at least hard to launch.
Client puzzles like [15, 16, 17, 18, 19] assume that an attacker does not have enough
resources to solve hard puzzles at a high rate or is not willing to perform a hard com-
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putational problem on a compromised machine in order to remain undetected to the
machines user. Client puzzles approaches are effective against DDoS attacks. However,
a legitimate client is also required to perform the same heavy computation, and users of
compromised machines may not easily distinguish between high CPU utilization due to
legitimate requests and due to attack requests launched from their machines.
1.2.2 Intrusion detection
The next step after attack prevention in defending against DDoS attacks is attack de-
tection. Intrusion detection is the most widely researched topic among DDoS defense
mechanisms [4]. These mechanisms aim to detect DDoS attack either based on the signa-
tures of known attacks (referred as Misuse Detection Schemes) or based on the feature(s)
of abnormal traffic behavior under the attack (known as Anomaly Detection Schemes).
The detection scheme in [20] is based on the fact that a normal TCP connection
starts with a SYN packet and ends with a FIN or RST packet, so when the SYN flood
starts, there will be more SYN packets than sum of FIN and RST packets. The authors
in [21] proposed a detection scheme called D-WARD to defend against DDoS attack at
the source-end, which works by comparing the measured statistics of the incoming and
outgoing traffic with the normal traffic for each type of traffic (e.g TCP, UDP) to detect the
attack flow. The basic idea of the scheme in [22] is to use the non-parametric Cumulative
Sum (CUSUM) method to check if the number of SYN packets during a detection period
exceeds a particular threshold. The detection scheme proposed in [23] is scalable to large
networks, but it does not provide any information about the IP addresses of attacker or
victim, which makes mitigation difficult. An efficient detection approach was proposed
in [24] for detecting the identities of DDoS attackers in web service based on the group
testing theory.
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1.2.3 Intrusion response
Once an attack is identified, the immediate response is to identify the attack source and
block its traffic accordingly. Research on intrusion tolerance believes that it is impossible
to prevent or stop DDoS completely and focuses on minimizing the attack impact and on
maximizing the quality of its services. Packet marking scheme in [25] construct attack
paths locally at the victim by collecting markings stamped into packets by intermediate
routers. However, this scheme is vulnerable to compromised routers, which can inject
forged markings to increase the number of false positive probability. Snoeren et al. [26]
proposed a hash-based IP traceback technique that uses a source path isolation engine.
This technique generates audit trails of traffic and can trace the origin of single IP packet
delivered by a network in recent past. The hash-based IP traceback technique uses a
very efficient method to store the information that a packet traversed through a partic-
ular router. The main advantage of this scheme over packet marking scheme is that it
can traceback the attack path even for low volume packets received at the victim. The
traceback scheme in [27] requires an order of magnitude smaller processing and storage
cost than the hash-based scheme in [26] but this scheme needs much more sophisticated
techniques to be used for traceback.
1.2.4 Intrusion mitigation
All the detection and response techniques discussed above aim to shorten the time needed
to detect the attack, and locate the attack sources. However, the intrusion mitigation
techniques accept that it is impossible to prevent or stop DDoS completely and focuses
on minimizing the attack impact and on maximizing the quality of its services. Pushback
architecture [28] detects the occurrence of a DDoS attack by observing congestion in
a router’s buffer, characterizes the traffic that creates the congestion, and act locally to
impose a rate limit on that traffic. The Reval mechanism in [29] proposed a framework for
automatic, on-line evaluation of the effects of DDoS defense mechanisms, such as black-
holing (directing attack traffic away from the paths of legitimate traffic through routing
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updates) and traffic scrubbing. Overlay-based system in [30] is effective in protecting
private services, with known clients, and services that require human intervention, such
as the Web.
With regard to the location of defense mechanism, we differentiate between mecha-
nisms deployed at the victim, intermediate, or source network. DDoS defense mechanisms
which deployed at the victim network protect this network from DDoS attacks and re-
spond to detected attacks by alleviating the impact on the victim. Historically, Most
of available detection mechanisms are victim-end mechanisms, since all of the flooding
attack traffic is aggregated at the victim side and thus the defense is relatively easier
there.
DDoS defense mechanisms deployed at the intermediate network are more effective
than a victim network mechanisms since the attack traffic can be handled easily and traced
back to the attackers. These mechanisms provide infrastructural protection service to a
large number of Internet hosts. Victims of DDoS attacks can contact the infrastructure
and request the service, possibly providing adequate compensation. However, the main
disadvantage of these approaches that they need wide deployment.
DDoS defense mechanisms deployed at the source network can stop attack flows before
they enter the Internet core and before they aggregate with other attack flows. These
mechanisms can facilitate easier traceback and investigation of the attack. A source
network mechanism has the same disadvantage as the intermediate network mechanism
of wide deployment. However, this disadvantage can be balanced by its ability to sacrifice
some of its resources and performance for better DDoS detection.
1.3 Thesis Outline
In this thesis, we propose effective defense schemes against the network-layer and the
application-layer DDoS attacks. Chapter 2 and 3 introduce defense schemes for the
network-layer DDoS attacks. Chapter 4 introduce defense scheme for the application-
layer DDoS attack. The thesis is organized as follows:
6
In chapter 2, we introduce a more general scheme for filtering outgoing spoofed flow
under any type of IP spoofing. The new scheme first assigns a key for each IP address in
the stub network. Then each client in the stub network marks his request packet (e.g.,
ICMP ECHOREQUEST and SYN packets) of the outgoing flow with the corresponding
key of his source address. Finally, based on this key the edge router which connects the
stub network with the Internet can verify legitimate flow and drop spoofed one. Thus, the
proposed scheme only needs to verify the request packet of each flow to pass or drop all
this flow’s packets. Extensive trace-driven simulation has been conducted to demonstrate
the efficiency of the proposed scheme under different types of IP spoofing.
Chapter 3 proposes a general and also sensitive detection scheme for the efficient de-
tection of the DDoS flooding agents under three common types of IP spoofing (namely
random spoofing, subnet spoofing and fixed spoofing). The proposed scheme is based
on the TCP SYN-SYN/ACK protocol pair with the consideration of packet header in-
formation (both sequence and Ack. numbers). The Counting Bloom Filter is first used
to classify all the incoming SYN/ACK packets into the first SYN/ACK packet stream
and the retransmission SYN/ACK packet stream. Then we extract two new traffic fea-
tures from these packets streams to make the detection more sensitive and also more
general. Finally, the Cumulative Sum Algorithm is adopted to make detection decision
independent of sites and traffic patterns.
Chapter 4 enhances the available detection approach Live Baiting for the DDoS at-
tackers in web service by distinguishing the clients activities (Active and Non-Active
clients during the detection interval) in the detection process and then further propose
a new adaptive threshold based on the Change Point Detection method, such that we
can improve the false positive probability and avoid the dependence of detection on sites
and access patterns. We conducted extensive trace-driven simulation has been conducted
on real Web trace to demonstrate the detection efficiency of the proposed scheme in
comparison with the Live Baiting detection scheme.
In chapter 5, we conclude the overall thesis and discusses the future works.
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1.4 Thesis Contributions
The thesis contributions are summarized below:
• With the help of marking only the outgoing request packet of each flow with the cor-
responding key of its source address, we propose a suitable filtering scheme for high
speed networks that can filter all the flow’s packets by verifying only the first request
packet. By deleting the key from the request packet in the flow after verification, we
introduce a more secure filtering scheme, where the attacker can not acquire the key
of any source address through any communication. The proposed scheme requires
only minor router and client modification and requires no modification inside the
network.
• we propose a Counting Bloom Filter-based scheme to classify the SYN/ACK packets
into the first SYN/ACK packets stream and the retransmission SYN/ACK packets
stream with the help of packet header information in terms of both sequence and
Ack. numbers. We suggest a new traffic feature index with the consideration of
both the difference between the number of outgoing SYN packets and incoming first
SYN/ACK packets and the difference between incoming first SYN/ACK packets and
incoming retransmission SYN/ACK packets. We demonstrate through extensive
trace-driven simulation that by adopting the new packets classification and the new
traffic feature index, it is possible for us to have a general detection scheme that can
provide a much more sensitive detection for low-rate flooding agents under different
types of IP spoofing.
• We significantly improve the promising detection approach Live Baiting for the
DDoS attackers in web service. Specially, we consider the clients activity (Active and
Non-Active clients during the detection interval) and then propose a new adaptive
threshold based on the Change Point Detection, such that we can improve the
false positive probability and avoid the dependence of detection on sites and access
patterns.
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Chapter 2
Novel Source-End Packet Filtering
Scheme for IP Spoofing Prevention
2.1 Introduction
The IP spoofing plays an important role in network attacks, in particular the flooding
DDoS attack, for a number of reasons. First, the IP spoofing makes it hard to distinguish
attack packets with spoofed source addresses from legitimate ones. Second, the IP spoof-
ing makes the detection of the flooding source very difficult, since it completely hides the
IP address of the flooding source. Finally, the common types of DDoS attack, such as
the TCP SYN flooding attack and the Distributed Reflection Denial of Service attack
(DRDoS), are not possible without the IP spoofing [31].
Although the next generation of the Internet Protocols (IPv6) uses authentication
header to limit the IP spoofing, it is only in its infancy in terms of general worldwide
deployment. Recent studies like [32] indicated that penetration of IPv6 was still less than
one percent of Internet-enabled hosts in any country. The leaders were Russia (0.76%),
France (0.65%), Ukraine (0.64%), Norway (0.49%), and the United States (0.45%). Al-
though Asia led in terms of absolute deployment numbers, the relative penetration was
smaller (e.g., China: 0.24%). The IPv6 secures only the session between the clients by
using authentication and does not provide any defense against spoofed packets [8].
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Based on the fact that Mac address is permanent and globally unique identification,
Mac address can be used to filter spoofed packets. However, MAC address itself can easily
be spoofed on most of today’s hardware [33]. In TCP/IP networks, the MAC address
of a subnet interface can be queried with the IP address using the Address Resolution
Protocol (ARP) for IPv4. This protocol is particular vulnerable due to the fact that it
makes use of broadcasts, and has not a single form of authentication in the protocol [34].
Therefore, the attackers can spoof Mac addresses and implement a simple man-in-the
middle attack, or in its simplest form to sniff a switched network.
The current cryptographic methods are not suitable for preventing IP spoofing be-
cause filtering approaches are deployed for each outgoing packet from the sub network.
Therefore, the high computation overhead of cryptographic operations prevents such ap-
proaches from being widely employed per packet. Also, the attacker can use the cryp-
tography scheme itself to launch the DDoS attack by sending many packets with invalid
authentication field. Thus, the router will perform computational heavy cryptographic
check. Also, the attacker can use the cryptographic methods itself to launch hard DDoS
attack on the clients by sending a stream of flooding packets with invalid authentication
field, such that clients will perform computational heavy cryptographic check.
To involve in IP spoofing, the attacker uses a variety of IP spoofing types (e.g. random
spoofing and subnet spoofing). Among different IP spoofing types, the subnet spoofed
source address is the most difficult IP spoofing type to be detected and filtered, because the
attacker spoofs a random address from the address space assigned to the agent machine’s
stub network. For example, the attacker with agent in the stub network 192.15.28.0/24
can spoof any address within the range of 192.15.28.0 to 192.15.28.255.
There are few and non effective prevention schemes have been proposed to filter out
spoofed packets. These schemes are discussed in details in section 2.2. With regard to
the location of prevention schemes, we differentiate between the ones deployed at the
victim sub network (victim-end prevention schemes) or source sub network (source-end
prevention schemes). Compared to the victim-end detection schemes, the source-end
detection schemes offer us several advantages. First, if we can filter attack packets early
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at the source end, the victim will gain more time to apply attack response mechanisms.
Second, the efficient method for preventing subnet spoofing is to drop spoofed packets
close to the source (agent’s stub network). Third, the filtering of attack packets near its
source can prevent flooding attack traffic from exhausting the network bandwidth and
protect legitimate users from denying their services. While source-end filtering is not
a complete solution for IP spoofing since attacker can spoof the address from networks
that do not deploy source-end filtering schemes, filtering the spoofed packets close to the
source is still necessary for some reasons:
• Currently, laws in some countries make the sender of malicious packets responsible
for the damage caused even if his computer is compromised by the attacker (as in
Italy’s law) [35].
• Source-end filtering can protect shared Internet resources from being exhausted by
dropping spoofed packets early close to the source.
• In cooperation with other filtering schemes (like SPM [8]), source-end filtering can
significantly drop spoofed packets.
These make source-end filtering one of the main steps of the complete solution for the
DDoS attack prevention.
The available source-end filtering schemes are not general enough to cover different
types of IP spoofing. Also, those schemes are not suitable for the high-speed networks,
since they need to verify every packet in the traffic (please refer to section 6 for related
work). Therefore, a new source-end filtering scheme is highly desirable for the efficient
detection of the DDoS flooding agents under different types of IP spoofing. In this paper
we propose such a scheme by assigning a key for each IP address in the stub network.
The key contributions of this chapter are given as follows:
1. With the help of marking only the outgoing request packet of each flow with the
corresponding key of its source address, we propose a suitable filtering scheme for
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high speed networks that can filter all the flow’s packets by verifying only the first
request packet.
2. By deleting the key from the request packet in the flow after verification, we intro-
duce a more secure filtering scheme, where the attacker can not acquire the key of
any source address through any communication.
3. The proposed scheme requires only minor router and client modification and requires
no modification inside the network.
4. We demonstrate through extensive trace-driven simulation that by verifying only
the request packets, it is possible for us to have a general filtering scheme that can
provide a much more efficient filtering for spoofed packets under different types of
IP spoofing.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related
work. Section 2.3 introduces the background of our scheme. Section 2.4 describes our
detection scheme in details. Section 2.5 presents the analytical model of the proposed
scheme. Section2.6 provides the related performance evaluation and finally, section 2.7
concludes this chapter.
2.2 Related Work
The main idea of the filtering schemes (source-end or victim-end) is to prevent the attack
by dropping the attack packets before reaching the victim. The router or firewall in Ingress
scheme [9] drops all incoming packets that have the source address which belongs to its
stub network, since such packets are clearly spoofed. The key disadvantage of Ingress
mechanisms is that the router should check the IP address of all the incoming packets,
which is not practical in the current high speed networks.
The authors in [12] proposed a filtering scheme based on the routing information.
The main problem of this scheme is that it requires the modification of the BGP message
12
scheme by adding the source addresses in BGP messages, this will significantly increase the
size and the processing time for BGP messages. Also, this scheme may drop legitimate
packets if there is a route change. The SVE protocol in [13] provides the router with
information about the range of expected source IP addresses at each interface, so the
router can build a table with a set of valid source addresses for each link. The main
problem of this scheme is that it needs to change routing protocol.
Based on the hop-count information, the [14] introduces a novel scheme for detecting
and filtering flooding DDoS packets with IP spoofing. Since only the hop-count infor-
mation is used in the detection, so this scheme does not need additional support from
routers. However, the hop count has a limited range but the IP address space is big,
so different IP addresses may correspond to the same hop count value. Therefore, this
scheme cannot recognize the spoofed packets whose source IP addresses have the same
hop count value as that of the legitimate ones.
In the spoofing prevention method (SPM) proposed in[8] an authentication key is
associated with each pair source destination autonomous systems (one or more networks
that are controlled by a single administration entity, for example, a university), and the
router close to each destination verifies the authenticity of the source address of a packet.
This scheme can reduce the number of the spoofed packets but it can not eliminate
completely the attacks, because the attacker may spoof the IP addresses from the address
space assigned to his autonomous system.
2.3 Background
2.3.1 The Flooding DDoS Attack
The common method to launch the flooding DDoS attack is to send a flow of flooding
packets with spoofed IP addresses from several agents to the victim in the same time,
such that it cannot respond to legitimate traffic. These spoofed packets lead to exhaust
the victim’s resources like bandwidth, buffers and CPU time. We believe that we able to
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prevent the flooding DDoS attack, if we can drop flow’s packets with spoofed IP address.
Therefore, we need to understand clearly how the agents start the flooding attack. The
flooding attack flow usually begin with three common request packets:
• SYN packets
The SYN packets are used in the TCP SYN flooding attack which exploits the
TCP’s three-way handshake mechanism and its limitation in maintaining half-open
connections. In this type of the DDoS attack, the attacker attacks a server by
ordering agents to send at the same time a stream of flooding SYN packets with
spoofed IP addresses, such that server’s backlog queue for half open connections
will be exhausted and any new legitimate SYN packets will be dropped. Also, those
packets used in the DRDoS attack by sending SYN packets to the reflectors with
spoofed source IP address of the victim, in response, all reflectors sends SYN/ACK
packets to the victim.
• ICMP packets
The ICMP packets are used in the ICMP flood attack by flooding the victim with a
large amount of ICMP ECHOREQUEST packets with spoofed IP source addresses,
so the victim can not respond to this amount of traffic. These packets are used also
in smurf attack. In such attack, the attacker sends a large amount of ICMP echo
requests (ping) traffic to IP broadcast addresses with spoofed source address of the
intended victim. As a result, the victim’s router delivering traffic to those broadcast
addresses delivers the IP broadcast to all hosts, most hosts on that IP network will
take the ICMP echo request and reply to it with an echo reply, multiplying the
traffic by the number of hosts responding. On a multi-access broadcast network,
hundreds of machines might reply to each packet.
• UDP packets
The UDP packets are used in the UDP flood attack. The agents in this type of
attack send a large number of UDP packets to the victim. When the victim receives
14
these packets and realizes that there is no application in the waiting port, it returns
a lot of ICMP packet to the forged source IP addresses. If enough UDP packets are
sent to the ports of the victim, the system will go down.
Based on the above abnormal agent’s flow, we can distinguish spoofed flow from non
spoofed flow from the first request packet. Whenever a flow starts, the router can verify
the authenticity of the source address of the first request packet. If the source IP address is
non spoofed, the flow will be allowed by forwarding the request packet, if not, the flow will
not be allowed by drop the request packet. The idea of verifying the whole flow was used
before to design a more secure network architecture for the enterprise in [36]. Therefore,
in our new filtering scheme, we focus on distinguishing between legitimate request packet
and spoofed request packet in the flow to prevent the IP spoofing.
2.3.2 The Ingress/Egress Filtering Scheme
It is notable that among source-end filtering schemes proposed by now, the Ingress/Egress
scheme in [9] is the simplest and most effective one. Ingress filtering means filtering the
traffic coming into the stub network, and Egress filtering means filtering the traffic leaving
the stub network. The idea behind the ingress/egress filtering is to only allow packet to
enter or leave the stub network if its source addresses are within the expected IP address
range as illustrated in the example in Fig.2.1.
Suppose an attacker X resides within the stub network. The input filter which placed
in router 1 only passes packets having a source IP address with the 204.69.207.0/24 prefix.
If attacker X sends traffic with spoofed IP addresses that do not have the 204.69.207.0/24
prefix (i.e random spoofing), that traffic will be dropped by the input filter in router
1. This filtering function provided by router 1 is called Egress filtering as it deals with
traffic leaving the stub network. On the other hand, if router 1 only receives packets whose
source address does not belong to the 204.69.207.0/24 prefix, that function is called Ingress
filtering as it deals with traffic coming to the stub network [1].
It is clear from Fig.2.1 that the spoofed packet with subnet spoofing can not be filtered
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Figure 2.1: An example of ingress/egress filtering from [1]
at all, because its source address within the attacker machine’s stub network address range.
For example, router 1 will pass all spoofed packets with spoofed address within the range
of 204.69.207.0 to 204.69.207.255. Also, this scheme needs to check every packet in the
flow, which makes it unsuitable for the current high speed networks. Therefore, a new
source-end detection scheme is highly desirable for the efficient filtering of the spoofed
DDoS flooding packets under all different types of IP spoofing.
2.4 A New Filtering Scheme
In this section, we present the overall architecture of our new filtering scheme, then we
describe the details of our new filtering scheme at edge routers (i.e Key generation and
flow verification) and clients (i.e packet marking).
2.4.1 Overall Architecture
The Fig.2.2 illustrates the overall architecture of the proposed filtering scheme, which
is installed at an edge router connecting a stub network to the Internet. The main
idea behind the proposed filtering scheme is that the edge router first securely generates
a key for each IP address in its stub network and each client in the stub network re-
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Figure 2.2: The structure of the new filtering scheme
ceives its valid key from the router . The client then marks any outgoing request (e.g.,
ICMP ECHOREQUEST and SYN packets) with its key. Finally, to prevent attackers
from spoofing the IP addresses, the key of the outgoing request packet in each flow is
checked at the edge router, such that any flow with spoofed address can be dropped.
2.4.2 Key Generation
In the proposed filtering scheme, the first function of the edge router is to assign a dif-
ferent key for each source address in the stub network. Since the current IPv4 protocol
uses 32 bit addresses and this limits the address space to 4,294,967,296 (232) possible
unique addresses, so the edge router in the proposed filtering scheme generates 232 keys.
Conceptually, the key can be generated using cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-2
[37]. We discard this approach because the key should be simple and use light calcula-
tion to make the router itself immune to the DDoS attack, since the router uses this
calculation for every incoming request on high volume flows. Instead, in the proposed
filtering scheme, the edge router generates a random string of 32 bits as the key for each
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IP address in the stub network (i.e the edge router should generate 232 different random
32 bit strings).
The keys are available to all IP addresses in the stub network including the attacker,
so attackers may try a large number of possible keys in order to know the key of the IP
address they want to spoof (brute-force attack). To solve this problem, the edge router
changes the key periodically, every day for instance. Once the keys are changed, the edge
router sends the new keys to all IP addresses in the stub network. Thus, the probability
of successfully guessing a valid key will be very low: 1
232
(i.e. one of every four billion
packets).
After assigning these keys, the edge router of each stub network will build a table
called key table. This key table contains the information of the clients addresses and their
related keys as illustrated in Fig.2.2. The key table consists of two columns:
1. The IP address
This column contains the available IP addresses of the stub network which is limited
by (232) possible unique addresses and each field in this column is four bytes to save
the IP address of every client.
2. The key
This column contains the key for the corresponding IP address in the IP address
column. Each field in this column is also four bytes since the router uses a random
string of 32 bits as the key for each IP address in the stub network as described
before.
Notice that in the proposed filtering scheme, the edge router only uses one table contains
all necessary information to verify the authenticity of the source address of any outgoing
flow. On the other hand, previous filtering schemes based on the authentication of keys
like [8] uses more than one table, which makes our scheme suitable for the current high
speed networks with high volume flows.
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2.4.3 Packet Marking
The proposed scheme requires minor client modification but it requires no modification
inside the networks and this reduces the addition vulnerabilities. When a client in the
stub network wants to send a flow of packets for the first time, he first contacts the router
and receives a key valid for a period of time (e.g., one day). Then, he marks each request
packet in each outgoing flow with this secret key.
One important issue in the proposed scheme is the place of this key in the packet.
Since the the main target of the key is to verify the authenticity of the source address
of the request packet in the flow, it should be placed in the same layer of the source IP
address to make the verification fast and effective. Also, the place of the key should be
compatible with all protocols (e.g, TCP, UDP and DCCP). For the previous reasons, in
the proposed scheme, we choose to put the key in the IP option field in the IP header,
because the IP header contains the source address of the sender and the Internet Protocol
is the primary protocol in the Internet layer which makes it suitable for all protocols. Also,
the IP option is rarely used in the IPv4 protocol and is used before to mark packets in
the previous filtering schemes like [8] and [10]. The option filed in the IP header consists
of 32 bit which makes it suitable for the proposed key as shown in Fig.2.3.
As mentioned before the key is changed periodically for the sake of security, so all
clients in the stub network will receive their new keys from the edge router after the keys
are changed. When the clients receives the new keys, they mark their outgoing requests
with the new keys and this makes our proposed scheme more secure.
2.4.4 Flow Verification
To support our proposed scheme, the second important function of the edge router is
to verify the authenticity of the source address of the outgoing request packet in each
flow. To verify the source address, the IP header needs to be accessed. This verification
is performed at edge routers, which are usually the trusted entities for the clients in the
same stub network. A multi-layer IPSec protocol [38] which is defined for the IPv4 allows
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Figure 2.3: The fields of an IP packet
trusted routers to access the Internet layer information. Therefore, the network-level
security of IPSec should not be an obstacle to the checking of IP option at edge routers.
The important requirement of the verification process is the security. This means
that the attacker can not acquire the key of any IP address through connection between
them. For example, the attacker can send a request to the source address he wants to
spoof and deduce the source key from the replay. Therefore, in the proposed scheme, the
client uses the key in the outgoing request packet only and the router deletes it after the
verification. By this way, the request packet arrives the receiver without any key which
makes it impossible to know the source key during any connection.
The edge router verifies any outgoing flow by comparing the key in its request packet
with the corresponding key for its IP address in the key table. If the key is the same, the
router will pass the whole flow after deleting the key from the option field in IP header
of the request packet. Otherwise the request packet will be dropped and the whole flow
will be dropped as well. For the example shown in the Fig.2.2, the edge router verify the
outgoing flows as follows.
1. When the edge router receives a request packets from the source address 192.15.28.1,
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the edge router first accesses the option field in the IP header to obtain the key value
which is ’kH’ in the first request packet and ’Dm’ in the second request packet.
2. Then, the edge router compares these keys with the corresponding key for the source
address 192.15.28.1 in the key table.
3. If the key in the request packet matches the key in the key table (like first request
packet with key equal ’kH’), the edge router will pass the hole flow which begins
with this request packet. In this case, the edge router deletes the key from this
request packet. Otherwise (like the second request packet with key equal ’Dm’), the
edge router will drop the whole flow which contains this spoofed request packet.
Based on this simple method of verification the edge router can efficiently drop any ma-
licious flow from its first request packet. Also, this method can filter spoofed requests
with any type of IP spoofing (e.g random, subnet and fixed), because the router does not
assign one key for more than one IP address at the same time.
2.5 The Analytical Model
The main target of the analytical model is to calculate the attack packet dropping ratio
of the new scheme in comparison with the available schemes. In particular we evaluate
the packet dropping ratio under the proposed scheme in comparison by egress scheme and
in combination with SPM scheme.
We assume that the Internet consists of M stub networks and the attacker uses N
stub networks to launch the DDoS attack to the victim stub network V . Each of these N
stub network contains one flooding agent. To avoid the efficient response from the victim,
the agents are commonly external to the victim’s own stub network (i.e N ≤M−1). The
total flooding attack rate R is distributed among these agents.
Let rij be the attack rate from the agent in stub network i with spoofed addresses
from network j. Let
∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1 rij be the total attack rate directed at stub network V .
We will evaluate the amount of the dropping attack packets to the victim stub network V
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under no filtering scheme, under the new filtering scheme in comparison with the egress
scheme and under the new filtering scheme with combination with the SPM scheme.
2.5.1 Under no Filtering Scheme
Under no filtering scheme, the total attack rate reaches the stub network V can be rep-
resented as:
R =
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
rij (2.1)
and the attack packet dropping ratio X is given by:
X = 0 (2.2)
2.5.2 Comparison with Egress Scheme
To compare the new proposed filtering scheme with the Egress scheme, we will deal with
the attack packet dropping ratio after deploying the two filtering schemes. We assume
that S stub networks of the total M stub networks deploy the egress filtering scheme.
The egress scheme can drop all spoofed packets except spoofed packets with subnet
spoofing. Thus, the attack packet dropping ratio Xe is given by:
Xe =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈M
j 6=i
rij (2.3)
in this case, the attack rate Re will includes all attack packets with subnet spoofing from
S stub networks and all attack packets from other stub networks (i.e. M − S).
Re =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈M
j=i
rij +
∑
i∈M−S
∑
j∈M
rij (2.4)
When the same number of stub networks S deploy the new scheme, all requests of the
outgoing flows from these S stub networks will be marked with their secret keys. Thus,
flows with spoofed IP addresses will be completely dropped at the edge routers under
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any type of IP spoofing, because their request packets will be marked with wrong keys.
Therefore, the attack packet dropping ratio Xn with the new scheme is given by:
Xn =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈M
rij (2.5)
and the attack rate Rn in this case is given by:
Rn =
∑
i∈M−S
∑
j∈M
rij (2.6)
It is clear from the previous equations that the attack rate dropping ratio after de-
ploying the new scheme is grater than the same ratio of the egress scheme. Also, the
attack rate after deploying the new scheme is less than the same rate after deploying
egress scheme. Therefore, The new filtering scheme provides relative benefit by reducing
the amount of the spoofed flooding packets.
Notice that in the egress scheme, the edge router checks the source address of each
outgoing packets in the flow to verify the authenticity of the source address of this flow.
On the other hand, in the proposed filtering scheme, the edge router checks only the key
of the request packet of the flow to verify the authenticity of the whole flow.
2.5.3 Combination with SPM scheme
The Spoofing Prevention Method (SPM) [8] enables routers closer to the destination of
a packet to verify the authenticity of the source address of the packet by first associating
a key with each ordered pair of source destination networks(AS’s, autonomous systems).
Then, each packet leaving a source network is tagged with the key of the source and the
destination networks. Finally, the key is verified and removed close to the destination
network.
While the SPM method limits the amount of spoofing packets, the SPM method
alone does not stop a source from spoofing another source IP address from the same
source AS network. The authors of SPM suggested to further limit the spoofing range by
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combining the SPM method with another source-end filtering scheme. Therefore our aim
is to evaluate the benefits of the proposed filtering scheme in combination with the SPM
method.
The attack rate dropping ratio after deploying the SPM method to the victim stub
network V is expressed in two terms. First it includes all attacks where the spoofed address
belongs to SPM. Second, it includes all attacks packets generated by stub networks in
SPM except attacks packets with subnet spoofing.
XSPM =
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈SPM
j 6=i
rij
+
∑
i∈SPM
∑
j∈M−SPM
rij V ∈ SPM (2.7)
When the V does not participate in SPM, it will not benefit. This yields:
XSPM = 0 V /∈ SPM (2.8)
If SPM method combines with the proposed filtering scheme, all outgoing attack pack-
ets under subnet spoofing will be dropped. Thus, Equation 2.7 and 2.8 will be changed
to:
XSPMN =
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈SPM
rij
+
∑
i∈SPM
∑
j∈M−SPM
rij V ∈ SPMN (2.9)
XSPMN =
∑
i∈SPM
∑
j∈M
rij V /∈ SPMN (2.10)
Where SPMN is the set of stub networks deploy SPM method with the new filtering
scheme.
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2.6 Performance Evaluation
The performance evaluation was conducted by trace driven simulation experiments, where
two real traffic traces were adopted in our simulation. The first trace was gathered at
DEC’s (now HP) primary Internet access point, which is an Ethernet DMZ network. It
contains an hour’s worth of all wide-area traffic between DEC Western Research Lab and
the Internet. The second trace was gathered at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory Internet
access point (LBL), which contains one hours worth of all wide-area traffic between the
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and the rest of the world [39].
To study the performance of the new filtering scheme, we first conducted simulation
by mixing the two traces of normal traffics with two types of flooding traffic:
1. TCP SYN flooding traffic.
2. UDP flooding traffic.
Since in the current DDoS attacks, the flooding rate is usually distributed among many
low-rate flooding agents to make the detection more difficult. To emulate the behavior of
this kind of low-agents, we assume that a stub network contains only one flooding agent.
In our simulation, the attack rate is 10 packets/sec for both SYN and UDP attacks, the
attack duration is set to 10 minutes, and the starting time of flooding attacks is chosen
randomly.
Fig.2.4 summarizes the dynamics of SYN packets distribution in normal and attack
traffic of the DEC trace and Fig.2.5 represents the dynamics of the SYN packets in the
LBL traces with and without SYN flooding attack. These two figures show clearly that
the number of request SYN packets under the SYN flooding attack exceed the number of
request SYN packets in normal traffic for the same trace.
To show the dynamics of the request UDP packets in normal and attack traffics for the
same traces, we analyzed the two traces and summarized their UDP packets distribution
in Fig.2.6 and Fig.2.7 respectively. From these two figures, we can observe that the
number of request UDP packets significantly increase under the UDP flooding attack for
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Figure 2.4: The dynamics of SYN packets in DEC traffic.
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Figure 2.5: The dynamics of SYN packets in LBL traffic.
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Figure 2.6: The dynamics of UDP packets in DEC traffic.
both DEC and LBL traces.
2.6.1 Random Spoofing
We first examined the filtering performance of both the new scheme and the Egress scheme
in case of SYN flooding attack under the random spoofed type. In our simulation here,
the rate was set as 10 SYN/sec and the attacker generates random IP address external
to the agent machine’s stub network. we assume that the attacker aware about the
new scheme, so he generates random key to mark all outgoing spoofed SYN packets.
The related dynamics behaviors of request SYN packets for the two traces are shown
in Fig.2.8. We can easily see from Fig.2.8 that the dynamics of SYN packets in the
DEC and the LBL traffics become identical with the dynamics of normal traffic in Fig.2.4
and Fig.2.5 respectively, so both our scheme and egress scheme can filter all the spoofed
SYN flooding packets in the two traffic. While both schemes drop all attack packets with
random spoofing in the two TCP traffics, the new scheme only verifies SYN packet in
each flow and the Egress scheme verifies all flow’s packets.
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Figure 2.7: The dynamics of UDP packets in LBL traffic.
To further study the filtering performance of our scheme and the egress scheme under
the UDP flooding attack, we conducted further simulation by mixing the two traces of
normal UDP traffics with flooding traffic of 10 UDP/sec with random spoofed addresses.
The corresponding dynamics of UDP packets in the DEC and LBL traces after applying
the two schemes are summarized in Fig.2.9.
Fig.2.9 shows that both schemes can drop all spoofed UDP packets from the two traffic
traces, because the distribution of UDP packets in DEC traffic and LBL traffic are the
same as normal UDP traffic in Fig.2.6 and Fig.2.7 respectively. It is clear that our scheme
verifies the authenticity of the source address of the UDP packets in the traffic, while the
egress scheme checks the source address of each packet in the traffic.
2.6.2 Subnet Spoofing
Finally, we examined the filtering performance of the two schemes under the subnet
spoofing type. We conducted simulation by mixing the two traces of normal traffics with
SYN flooding attack and UDP flooding attack of 10 packet/sec. The dynamics of SYN
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Figure 2.8: The dynamics of SYN packets under random spoofing after deploying filtering
schemes.
29
0 600 1200 1800 2400 3000 3600
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
6000
N
um
be
r o
f u
dp
 p
ac
ke
ts

Time (sec)
 Egress scheme
 New scheme
(a) DEC traffic
0 600 1200 1800 2400 3000 3600
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
N
um
be
r o
f u
dp
 p
ac
ke
ts

Time (sec)
 Egress scheme 
 new scheme
(b) LBL traffic
Figure 2.9: The dynamics of UDP packets under random spoofing after deploying filtering
schemes.
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packets and UDP packets in the outgoing traffic after deploying the Egress scheme and
the new scheme in the two traces are shown in Fig.2.10 and Fig.2.11, respectively.
Fig.2.10 shows clearly that in case of DEC and LBL traffics under the subnet spoofing,
our scheme can easily drop all spoofed SYN packets and the dynamics of the SYN packets
in the two traces become normal like Fig.2.4 and Fig.2.5 respectively. On the other hand,
the egress scheme can not filter the spoofed SYN packets in DEC and LBL traffics at all.
Also, by comparing Fig.2.11 with Fig.2.6 and Fig.2.7, we can observe that our scheme
completely drops all spoofed UDP packets in the two UDP traffics. The Fig.2.11 further
shows that the egress scheme can not drop spoofed UDP packets from the two UDP traffic
traces, since the source addresses of the spoofed UDP packets within the stub network
range.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed an efficient scheme for filtering the spoofed IP packets under
different types of IP spoofing. We demonstrated through analysis and extensive trace-
driven simulations that by assigning a key for each IP address in the stub network and
then marking the outgoing request of each flow by this key, the new scheme achieved two
benefits. First, the proposed scheme is general for filtering outgoing spoofed flows under
any type of IP spoofing. Second, the new scheme is suitable for the current high speed
networks since it can filter all the flow’s packets by verifying only its first request packet.
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Figure 2.10: The dynamics of SYN packets under subnet spoofing after deploying filtering
schemes.
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Figure 2.11: The dynamics of UDP packets under subnet spoofing after deploying filtering
schemes.
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Chapter 3
General Router Based Detection for
DDoS Flooding Agents with IP
Spoofing
3.1 Introduction
Over 90% of DDoS attacks use TCP protocol and the TCP SYN flooding attack is the
most common one among them[40]. The TCP SYN flooding exploits the TCP’s three-
way handshake mechanism and its limitation in maintaining half-open connections. In a
typical SYN flooding attack, the malicious client (attacker) first compromises relay hosts
(masters), which in turn compromise attack machines (agents) as illustrated in Fig.1.1.
The attacker attacks a victim’s server by ordering agents to send at the same time a
stream of flooding SYN packets with spoofed IP addresses, such that server’s backlog
queue for half open connections is exhausted and any new legitimate SYN packets will be
dropped.
Intrusion detection is the most widely researched topic [1]. The intrusion detection
schemes detect DDoS attack either based on the signatures of known attacks (referred as
Misuse Detection Schemes) or based on the feature(s) of abnormal traffic behavior under
the attack (known as Anomaly Detection Schemes).
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In the misuse detection schemes, like CISCO’s NetRanger[41], NID[42], SecureNet
PRO[43], RealSecure[44] and NFRNID[45], the signatures of known attacks are saved in
a database and compared with each communication to decide the occurrence of DDoS
attack. A key advantage of this detection method is that the signatures are easy to
develop and understand, which makes these schemes suitable to detect known DDoS
attacks. However, the main problem of these schemes is that a signature must be created
for each attack so they can only detect known DDoS attacks but novel DDoS attacks. Also,
they are vulnerable to high probability of false positives since they are commonly based
on regular expressions and string matching. On the other hand, the anomaly detection
schemes, like [46],[23],[14], and [20], work by monitoring system activity and classifying
it as either normal or attack. The classification is usually based on abnormal features,
rather than patterns or signatures.
With regard to the location of detection schemes, we differentiate between the ones
deployed at the victim sub network (victim-end detection schemes) or source sub net-
work (source-end detection schemes). Most of available detection schemes are victim-end
schemes, like [47],[23], and [22], since all of the flooding attack traffic is aggregated at
the victim side and thus the detection is relatively easier there. While these schemes are
robust and simple, they can not provide any information about the IP address of the
attacker, which usually spoofs the IP address in the flooding attack packets. Therefore,
they need to rely on the expensive IP traceback mechanisms for the detection of attacker.
Also, these schemes detect the attack after the flooding attack packets pass through the
network and share the same paths as legitimate packets, which significantly exhausts the
network resources.
Compared to the victim-end detection schemes, the source-end detection schemes offer
us several advantages. First, if we can detect attack source early at the source end, the
victim will gain more time to apply intrusion response mechanisms. Second, the early
detection of attack close to its source can help to detect the IP address of the attacker
without applying the expensive traceback mechanisms. Third, the detection of attack near
its source can prevent flooding attack traffic from exhausting the network bandwidth and
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protect legitimate users from denying their services. However, the source-end detection
faces several main challenges:
• The current DDoS attack is usually distributed among many low-rate flooding
agents, which makes the flooding traffic from each agent is small compared to the
normal traffic, so the detection should be sensitive enough.
• The detection should be as fast as possible and also has low probability of false
positive, such that the victim has more time to deploy response mechanisms.
• In the current large scale DDoS attacks, the attacker usually adopts IP spoofing to
spoof the source address of flooding attack packets, which makes the detection more
hard close to the source sub network.
The available source-end detection schemes are not general enough to cover different
types of IP spoofing. Also, those schemes are less sensitive and not suitable for the
detection of low rate flooding sources (please refer to section 5 for related work). Therefore,
a new source-end detection scheme is highly desirable for the efficient detection of the
DDoS flooding agents under different types of IP spoofing. In this paper we propose such
a scheme by exploring in more detail the behavior of TCP SYN-SYN/ACK pair. The
main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1. With the help of packet header information in terms of both sequence and Ack. num-
bers, we propose a Counting Bloom Filter-based scheme to classify the SYN/ACK
packets into the first SYN/ACK packets stream and the retransmission SYN/ACK
packets stream.
2. We suggest a new traffic feature index with the consideration of both the differ-
ence between the number of outgoing SYN packets and incoming first SYN/ACK
packets and the difference between incoming first SYN/ACK packets and incoming
retransmission SYN/ACK packets.
3. We demonstrate through extensive trace-driven simulation that by adopting the
new packets classification and the new traffic feature index, it is possible for us to
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have a general detection scheme that can provide a much more sensitive detection
for low-rate flooding agents under different types of IP spoofing.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the related
work. Section 3.3 introduces the background of our scheme. Section 3.4 describes our
detection scheme in detail. Section 3.5 provides the related performance evaluation and
comparison. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes this chapter.
3.2 Related Work
In general, the victim-end detection schemes can be classified as statefull and state-
less schemes. In stateful detection schemes like SYN cookies[48], SYN cache[49], SYN
Defender[50], SYN proxing[51], and SYNkill[52], all the states of TCP connections must
be maintained during the entire detection period, which makes these schemes themselves
vulnerable to the DDoS flooding attack. Also, these stateful schemes can not provide any
information about the IP address of attacker, so they need to rely on the expensive IP
traceback mechanism for the detection of attacker.
On the other hand, in the stateless detection schemes like[22],[20],[14] and [23], no
per-connection state is kept during the detection period, so these schemes are immune
to the DDoS attack. The basic idea of the scheme in [22] is to use the non-parametric
Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) method to check if the number of SYN packets during a
detection period exceeds a particular threshold. The main problem with this scheme is
that only the number of SYN packets can not really reflect the attacker’s behavior, because
even the number of normal SYN packets may vary dramatically from time to time and
from sub network to sub network. Also this scheme is not sensitive to low-rate flooding
attack. The authors in [20] proposed detection a scheme based on the fact that a normal
TCP connection starts with a SYN packet and ends with a FIN or RST packet, so when
the SYN flood starts, there will be more SYN packets than sum of FIN and RST packets.
However, this scheme can be easily defeated if the attacker sends equal numbers of FIN
and SYN packets during the attack time. Also, this scheme does not consider the problem
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of IP spoofing. Based on the hop-count information, the [14] introduces a novel scheme for
detecting and filtering flooding DDoS packets with IP spoofing. Since only the hop-count
information is used in the detection, so this scheme does not need additional support
from routers. However, the hop count has a limited range but the IP address space is big,
so different IP addresses may correspond to the same hop count value. Therefore, this
scheme cannot recognize the spoofed packets whose source IP addresses have the same
hop count value as that of the legitimate ones. The detection scheme proposed in [23] is
scalable to large networks, but it does not provide any information about the IP addresses
of attacker or victim, which makes mitigation difficult.
A few source-end detection schemes have been proposed so far, like MULTOPS[46],
D-WARD[21], SYN-dog[53] and MANAnet[54]. The MULTOPS[46] detects DDoS attack
by first using a tree structure to monitor the upstream and the downstream traffic in the
sub network. Then, the difference between the incoming packet rate and the outgoing
packet rate for each host is computed. Finally, the detection decision is made based on
the assumption that the difference is within a small range during normal traffic. The
main disadvantage of this scheme that it uses a tree structure for each host in the sub
network, which makes the scheme itself vulnerable to memory exhausting especially when
the attacker uses many agents with spoofed IP addresses. Also, this scheme is not general
enough to detect all types of IP spoofing (especially the mixed spoofing), because it
depends on the aggregation of the upstream and the downstream traffics. The authors
in [21] proposed a defense scheme called D-WARD to defend against DDoS attack at
the source-end, which works by comparing the measured statistics of the incoming and
outgoing traffic with the normal traffic for each type of traffic (e.g TCP, UDP) to detect
the attack flow. The main problem with this scheme is that in the current large scale
DDoS attacks, the flooding rate of an attacker is usually distributed among many low-rate
flooding agents in different sub networks, which makes this scheme not sensitive enough to
detect low-rate flooding agents. The MANAnet scheme [54] is actually a set of routers with
additional functionality that, in cooperation with other neighboring MANAnet routers,
can substantially reduce the impact of flooding attack packets. The disadvantage of this
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scheme is that it requires wide deployment and also a modification of current IP protocol.
3.3 Background
3.3.1 IP Spoofing
IP Spoofing is the technique used to gain unauthorized access to the victim computer,
whereby the attacker sends flooding packets to the victim with a forged IP address indi-
cating that the packets are coming from a trusted host. To involve in IP spoofing, the
attacker first uses a variety of methods to find an IP address of a trusted host and then
modifies the flooding packets header so that it appears that the packet is coming from
that host.
The IP spoofing plays an important role in network attacks, in particular the DDoS
attack, for a number of reasons. First, the IP spoofing makes it hard to distinguish attack
packets with spoofed source addresses from legitimate packets. Second, the IP spoofing
makes the detection of the flooding source very difficult, since it completely hides the
IP address of the flooding source. Finally, the common types of DDoS attack, such as
the TCP SYN flooding attack and the Distributed Reflection Denial of Service attack
(DRDoS) [31], are not possible without the IP spoofing.
In general, the IP spoofing techniques used in the DDoS attack can be classified into
three types [3]:
1. Random spoofed source address :
The random spoofed technique is the simplest and the most common technique in
the attack, since it can be achieved by simply generating random 32-bit numbers
and replacing the IP addresses in the flooding attack packets with them.
2. Subnet spoofed source address :
The subnet spoofed source address is the most difficult IP spoofing technique to
be detected[55], because the attacker spoofs a random address from the address
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Figure 3.1: TCP three way handshake.
space assigned to the agent machine’s sub network. For example, the attacker with
agent in the sub network 192.15.28.0/24 can spoof any address within the range of
192.15.28.0 to 192.15.28.255. Thus the spoofed flooding packets under this type can
not be filtered with the popular filtering mechanisms like[56].
3. Fixed spoofed source address :
In this technique the attacker chooses the spoofed IP address from a fixed list that
contains the addresses of the reflectors.
3.3.2 SYN Flooding Attack
Based on the TCP protocol, a client initiates a new connection between itself and a server
through a 3-way handshake (see Fig.3.1). First, the client sends a SYN packet to the
server requesting a new connection with initial sequence number (ISN). To acknowledge
the receipt of this SYN packet, the server replies the client by sending it a SYN/ACK
packet with an Acknowledgment (Ack.) number of ISN+1. Finally, the client sends the
server an ACK packet acknowledging the receipt of the SYN/ACK packet. If the server
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Figure 3.2: TCP SYN flooding attack under subnet spoofing.
does not receive the final ACK packet, it will retransmit the SYN-ACK 5 times, doubling
the time-out value after each retransmission. The initial time-out value is 3 seconds, so
retries are attempted at 3, 6, 12, 24, and 48 seconds[57]. It is notable that in the above
3-way handshake process, the server will remain in half-open connection state before
receiving final ACK packet. Since the server’s backlog queue allocated for maintaining
half-open connections is finite, so there is a limitation on the maximum number of half-
open connections that can be maintained.
The TCP SYN flooding attack works just by exploiting the above limitation of 3-way
handshake. The attack begins when the master sends control packets to agents (please
refer to Fig.1.1), ordering them to attack a given victim server. The agents then start at
the same time to send a stream of flooding SYN packets with spoofed IP addresses to the
victim server. Since these spoofed IP addresses are inaccessible, so the victim server can
not reach them. As a result, many half open connections will be created, leading to an
exhaustion of server’s backlog queue and thus the dropping of any new legitimate SYN
packets (denial of service).
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Figure 3.3: The structure of new SYN-spoof detection scheme
3.3.3 The SYN-dog Detection Scheme
The work of this paper is inspired by the SYN-dog source-end detection scheme proposed
recently in [53], [58], which is by now the simplest and most stateless one. The idea
behind SYN-dog is to explore the inherent abnormal behavior of TCP SYN-SYN/ACK
pair under SYN flooding attack for the detection of it. Since one SYN packet of a normal
TCP connection will result in the SYN/ACK packet in the reverse direction within one
round-trip time (RTT) (please refer to Fig.3.1), so under normal condition the difference
between the number of outgoing SYN packets and the incoming SYN/ACK packets in a
given sub network is small (may not be zero). Under a SYN flooding attack, however,
the number of outgoing SYN packets from the attacker’s sub network will be significantly
higher than the number of incoming SYN/ACK packets, because the attacker sends a lot
of SYN packets to the victim at the same time with spoofed IP addresses. To detect the
SYN flooding source of a sub network based on the above abnormal traffic behavior, the
SYN-dog scheme first records the total numbers of outgoing SYN packets and incoming
SYN/ACK packets during every observation period at the leaf router of the sub network.
42
Then the difference between the numbers of these two packet streams is calculated and
normalized by the average number of incoming SYN/ACK packets to make this difference
independent of both observation time and also the sub network size. Finally, based on
this difference, the Cumulative sum algorithm is applied to make the detection decision.
This scheme is robust in the sense that the attacker can not send SYN/ACK packets.
Also, this scheme is independent of the duration of the TCP connection, so it requires short
detection time. It is notable, however, that the main problem of the SYN-dog scheme
is that it depends only on a simple counting of SYN packets and SYN/ACK packets
without the consideration of any packet header information. Therefore, this scheme can
not distinguish the first SYN/ACK packet from the retransmission SYN/ACK packets
in the above counting process, which makes it less sensitive to low-rate attack. As a
result, this scheme can not efficiently detect the low-rate flooding agents especially in a
large sub network. Also, this scheme was developed based on the assumption that the
attacker spoofs a random address external to the address space assigned to the agent
machine’s sub network. Based on this assumption, the SYN packets from the agent and
SYN/ACK packets from the victim’s server pass through different routers. In the current
IP spoofing techniques, however, the attacker may spoof a random address from any
sub network. For example, in the subnet spoofing technique, the attacker chooses the
spoofed IP address from the address space assigned to the agent machine’s sub network
as illustrated in Fig.3.2. It is clear that the attack SYN packet from the agent and the
SYN/ACK packet from the victim’s server pass through the same leaf router connecting
the agent’s sub network to the Internet. Therefore, for the TCP SYN flooding attack
with the current complex IP spoofing techniques, the SYN-dog scheme may result in high
probability of false negative. Thus, a more general and more sensitive detection scheme
is highly desirable for the efficient detection of low-rate flooding agents under different
types of IP spoofing.
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3.4 A New Agent Detection Scheme
In this section, we first show the overall architecture of our new detection scheme, then we
introduce in details its Counting Bloom Filter (CBF) module, traffic features considered
and the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm module.
3.4.1 Overall Detection Architecture
The Fig.3.3 illustrates the overall architecture of our proposed detection scheme (namely
SYN-spoof), which is installed at a leaf router connecting a sub network to the Internet.
The main idea behind SYN-spoof is to first improve the detection sensitivity by using
CBF to classify all the incoming SYN/ACK packets to the sub network into two streams,
the first SYN/ACK packets (SYN/ACKf ) and the retransmission SYN/ACK packets
(SYN/ACKr). With the help of this classification, we then extract two new traffic features
from both SYN/ACKf and SYN/ACKr packets streams. Finally, we apply the CUSUM
algorithm based on these two traffic features to make final detection decision.
3.4.2 Counting Bloom Filter
The Bloom Filter, which was first proposed by Bloom [59], is an excellent data structure
for representing a set in order to support membership queries. Recently, the Bloom Filter
technique was used in detecting and defending against DDoS attacks, see, for example,
[26, 47, 55, 60, 61].
A variant of the Bloom Filter is Counting Bloom Filter (CBF)[62], where each bit of the
original filter is replaced by a counter. A CBF for representing a set X = {x1, x2, ..., xl} is
just an array of m counters with initial value of 0. A set of k independent hash functions,
h1, h2, ..., hk, each with output range of {0, 1, ...,m− 1}, are used to map the elements of
X to the CBF. The Fig.3.4 illustrates a simple CBF with m = 14 and k = 3.
In our SYN-spoof scheme, the main function of CBF is to classify the SYN/ACK
packets into SYN/ACKf and SYN/ACKr packets by recording the ISN (initial sequence
number) of any outgoing SYN packet from the sub network and comparing it with the
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Ack. number to its corresponding SYN/ACK packets, so that we can exactly calculate
the number of the first SYN/ACK packets and the number of retransmission SYN/ACK
packets and thus make our scheme more sensitive and generally applicable. For the
example shown in Fig.3.4, the CBF in our detection scheme works as follows.
1. When we receive a SYN packet with ISN number equals to x1 (or x2), we first hash
x1 with the three hash functions (k=3 here) to obtain three counter positions in the
CBF, then we increment the corresponding counters in these positions by one (like
Fig.3.4(b)).
2. When we receive a SYN/ACK packet with Ack. number equals to y1 (Fig.3.4(c)),
to query if this packet is the first SYN acknowledgment or not, we first hash y1−1
(notice that Ack. number = ISN+1) with the same three hash functions and then
check the corresponding three counters in the CBF. If all the three counters in these
positions are not 0 (like first case in Fig.3.4(c)), then we classify this packet as a
SYN/ACKf packet. In this case, we need to delete from CBF the record of the
corresponding SYN packet by decrementing the related counters by one. Otherwise
(like the second case in Fig.3.4(c)), we classify this packet as a SYN/ACKr packet.
3. Do Step 1) for any outgoing SYN packet and Step 2) for any incoming SYN/ACK
packet during the observation period.
It is notable that in the CBF, a counter can be incremented by multiple packets (like
the counter corresponding to the hash function h2 of x1 in Fig.3.4(b)). This kind of
multiple increments of a counter may cause the false results in the classification phase
(Fig.3.4(c)). The probability that the CBF will give a false result is referred to as the false
positive rate perr. For a CBF with k hash functions, m counters and l inserted elements,
its perr is given as [59]:
perr ≈
(
1− e−kl/m
)k
(3.1)
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(a) CBF structure
(b) SYN packet recording in CBF
(c) SYN/ACK packets classification in CBF
Figure 3.4: An example of CBF with m=14 counters and k=3 hash functions
The value of k that minimizes the perr is
k ≈
m
l
ln 2 (3.2)
which gives the perr of
perr =
(
1
2
)k
(3.3)
For a given perr requirement, we can determine a constant k based on Equation (3.3).
Therefore, the time needed to insert elements or to query for elements is just O(k), which
makes the CBF suitable for the high-speed detection of DDoS attacks.
3.4.3 Traffic Feature Extraction
The efficiency of any detection scheme (victim-end or source-end) is largely correlated by
the traffic feature(s) used in the scheme, because it provides traffic information to the de-
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cision module (e.g., CUSUM, threshold and Hidden Markov Model) and will significantly
affect the efficiency of final detection decision. Before introducing the traffic features to
be considered in our detection scheme, we first need to understand the traffic behaviors
before and after attack.
Under normal condition (without DDoS attack), one SYN packet of a TCP connection
will result in one SYN/ACKf packet in the reverse direction within one round-trip time
(RTT) (please refer to Fig.2), so the difference between the number of outgoing SYN
packets and the incoming SYN/ACKf packets in a given sub network is small (may not
be zero) but the number of SYN/ACKf packets always exceeds the number of SYN/ACKr
packets. Under a SYN flooding attack with spoofed IP addresses, however, the behavior
of TCP SYN-SYN/ACK will be abnormal and this abnormal traffic behavior is highly
related to the the spoofing technique used by the attacker as follows:
1. Case 1: Random spoofing
Here, the attacker generates random IP addresses external to the agent machine’s
sub network. In this case, the number of outgoing SYN packets from the agent’s
sub network will be significantly higher than the number of incoming SYN/ACKf
packets from the victim’s sub network, because the agent sends a lot of SYN packets
to the victim with spoofed IP addresses and all SYN/ACK are sent to other sub
networks.
2. Case 2: Subnet spoofing
The attacker spoofs a IP address from the address space assigned to the agent
machine’s sub network. In this case, the number of incoming SYN/ACKr packets
from the victim’s sub network will exceed the number of incoming SYN/ACKf
packets to the agent’s sub network, because the victim sends a lot of retransmission
SYN/ACK packets to the agent’s sub network.
3. Case 3: Mixed spoofing
The attacker mixes the spoofed IP addresses from the address space assigned to
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the agent machine’s sub network with IP addresses from other sub networks. In
this case, the number of outgoing SYN packets from the agent’s sub network will
be higher than the number of incoming SYN/ACKf packets and the number of
incoming SYN/ACKr packets from the victim’s sub network will exceed the number
of incoming SYN/ACKf packets to the agent’s sub network.
Based on the above abnormal traffic behaviors, some detection schemes for DDoS
flooding attack have been proposed, like [46], [21], [53]. Since some simple traffic feature
indexes were adopted in these schemes, so they are not sensitive and general enough to
detect low-rate attack and to cover all above three types of IP spoofing (please refer to
Section 5 for related work). Now, with the help of SYN/ACKf and SYN/ACKr informa-
tion (through CBF classification), we consider the following two traffic features during an
observation time period:
1. The difference between the number of SYN packets and the number of SYN/ACKf
packets.
2. The difference between the number of SYN/ACKf packets and the number of
SYN/ACKr packets.
The first difference makes our scheme sensitive to low-rate agents under random spoofing
type, because we avoid the effect of the SYN/ACK retransmission packets. The second
difference is used to detect agents under subnet spoofing. Thus, adopting a new traffic
feature index based on these two features in the final decision phase (i.e., the CUSUM
algorithm phase) makes it possible to cover the random spoofing, subnet spoofing and
also their combination (i.e., the mixed spoofing).
3.4.4 Cumulative Sum Algorithm
The Cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm, which was first proposed in[63], is one of the
Change Point Detection method[64] that is generally adopted to test if an observed time
series is statistically homogeneous. When a change occurs to a homogeneous series (i.e., a
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sudden change from homogeneous to heterogeneous), the CUSUM algorithm can be used
to efficiently determine the point in time when this change happens. The main function
of the CUSUM algorithm in our SYN-spoof scheme is to make the final detection decision
based on a new traffic feature index, so that we can detect low-rate flooding agents under
different types of IP spoofing.
The new traffic feature index of our scheme needs to account for the effects of the two
traffic features discussed in section 3.3. Let δ1n denote the first feature (i.e., the differ-
ence between the number of outgoing SYN packets and number of incoming SYN/ACKf
packets) within the observation period n, and let δ2n denote the second feature (the dif-
ference between the number of incoming SYN/ACKf packets and the number of incoming
SYN/ACKr) during the same observation period n. To eliminate the dependence of δ1n
and δ2n upon the observation time, traffic pattern and also the sub network size, they
should be normalized by the average number S¯ of incoming SYN/ACKf packets during
each observation time period. The S¯ can be estimated in real time and update periodically
from the following Equation [58]:
S¯(n) = αf¯(n− 1) + (1− α)SY N/ACK(n) (3.4)
where n is the discrete time index and α is a constant lying strictly between 0 and 1 that
represents the memory in the estimation. Let D1n = δ1n/S¯(n), D2n = δ2n/S¯(n), then D1n
and D2n are independent of the sub network size and observation time.
Summarizing the above two features together, we introduce a new traffic feature index
Xn as
Xn =
√
D21n +D
2
2n (3.5)
Notice that Xn can actually account for the three cases of IP spoofing as follows:
1. Under random spoofing, the difference between the incoming SYN/ACKf packets
and the number of incoming SYN/ACKr will be very small, thus Xn ≈
√
D21n =
|D1n|.
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2. Under subnet spoofing, the difference between the number of outgoing SYN packets
and number of incoming SYN/ACKf packets will be very small, thus Xn ≈
√
D22n =
|D2n|.
3. Under mixed spoofing, Xn can account for the two differences.
We can consider {Xn, n = 1, 2, 3, ...} as a set of an independently distributed random
variables. We will use a nonparametric CUSUM algorithm to make the detection decision,
because it is very difficult to get the exact distributions of pre-attack and post-attack of
the IP traffic [65]. Under normal operation, we have E(Xn) = c. We define a as an upper
bound of c and define X˜n = Xn− a, then X˜n has a negative mean E0(X˜n) < 0 before the
attack and a positive mean Eλ(X˜n) > 0 after the staring time λ of attack. Therefore, the
nonparametric CUSUM is given by
Yn = max
1≤λ≤n
n∑
i=λ
X˜i (3.6)
Under normal conditions, the Yn remains close to zero. When the attack starts, however,
it suddenly become large positive and exceeds the threshold. The statistic Yn can be
computed recursively as follow:
Yn = (Yn−1 + X˜n)
+, Y0 = 0, (3.7)
where x+ equals to x if x > 0 and 0 otherwise. Since a large Yn is a strong indication of
SYN flooding attack, so we can define the corresponding decision rule as [66]:
dN(Yn) = I(Yn > N), (3.8)
where N is the decision threshold and I(·) is the indicator function at observation period
n, which gives value ‘1’ to indicate an attack and ‘0’ to indicate a normal condition. Based
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on Yn, the stopping time TST (i.e, the alarm time) can be easily determined as
TST (N) = min {n ≥ 1 : Yn ≥ N} (3.9)
3.5 Performance Evaluation
3.5.1 Simulation Environment
The performance evaluation was conducted by trace driven simulation experiments, where
three traces of all wide area traffic between the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC)
and the rest of the world [39] were adopted in our simulation. Each trace there contains
one hour’s worth traffic gathered at DEC’s primary Internet access point, which is an
Ethernet DMZ network. The first trace (PKT-1) was obtained from 22:00 to 23:00 on
March 8, 1995, the second trace (PKT-2) was taken on March 9, 1995 from 02:00 to
03:00, and the last trace (PKT-3) was collected on March 9, 1995 from 14:00 to 15:00.
In our proposed SYN-spoof scheme, we set the false positive rate perr as 0.0004, which
is in general acceptable for the efficient detection of DDoS attack[47]. According to the
real traces analysis and parameters in[58], we choose a as 1.8 and N as 1 in our CUSUM
algorithm, and we fix the observation period as 20 seconds in our simulation.
3.5.2 Normal Traffic Behavior
To have a full understanding of normal traffic behavior, we analyzed the three traces
and summarized their SYN, SYN/ACKf and SYN/ACKr packets distributions in Fig.3.5.
The correlation coefficient between the collected numbers of outgoing SYNs and incoming
SYN/ACKf was also computed for each trace. We found that the correlation coefficient
is 0.822 for PKT-1, 0.879 for PKT-2 and 0.822 for PKT-3.
The above results and also Fig.3.5 indicate that a very strong positive correlation
exists between the SYN and SYN/ACKf packets in the normal traffic, and this strong
correlation is not sensitive to the request arrival process, the observation time, sites and
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Figure 3.5: The dynamics of SYN, SYN/ACKf and SYN/ACKr packets
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Figure 3.6: CUSUM test statistics of normal traffic.
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time-of-day. To show the performance of our SYN-spoof scheme when it is applied to the
above normal traffics, we tested the statistics, y(n), for all the three traces. The related
results are summarized in Fig.3.6. This figure shows clearly that the y(n) of these three
traces are always much smaller than the threshold N = 1, so no false alarm is reported
by our scheme.
3.5.3 Attack Traffic Behavior
To study the performance of our SYN-spoof scheme under SYN flooding attack, we con-
ducted further simulation by mixing the three traces of normal traffics with the flooding
traffic. Since in the current DDoS attacks, the flooding rate is usually distributed among
many low-rate flooding agents to make the detection more difficult. To emulate the be-
havior of this kind of low-agents, we assume that a sub network contains only one flooding
agent1. Therefore, the flooding rate recorded by our scheme is just the flooding rate of
individual agent inside a sub network. In our simulation, the attack duration is set to 10
minutes as that in [58] and the starting time point (denoted as ns hereafter) of flooding
attacks is chosen randomly. Fig.3.7 presents the distribution of the SYN, SYN/ACKf
and SYN/ACKr of PKT-1 trace under flooding rate 7 syn/sec. From this figure, we can
observe that:
• Under the random spoofed type (case 1), the number of outgoing SYN packets is
significantly higher than the number of incoming SYN/ACKf packets.
• Under the subnet spoofed type (case 2), the number of incoming SYN/ACKr packets
exceeds the number of incoming SYN/ACKf packets to the agent’s sub network.
• Under the mixed IP spoofed (case 3), the number of outgoing SYN packets from
the agent’s sub network is higher than the number of incoming SYN/ACKf packets
and the number of incoming SYN/ACKr packets exceeds the number of incoming
SYN/ACKf packets to the agent’s sub network.
1Notice that if there are more agents in one sub network, the detection will be more easy than the
single agent case
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(a) Random spoofing
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(b) Subnet spoofing
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(c) Mixed spoofing
Figure 3.7: The dynamics of SYN, SYN/ACKf and SYN/ACKr packets under attack
rate of 7 syn/sec.
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3.5.4 Sensitivity of SYN-spoof
We first examined the detection sensitivity of both our scheme and the SYN-dog scheme in
case of low-rate and high-rate attacks under the random spoofed type. In our simulation
here, the PKT-1 trace is used as the normal background traffic, and flooding traffic rate
was set as 7 SYN/sec and 15 SYN/sec respectively. The related accumulative dynamics
behaviors of y(n) for the two schemes are shown in Fig.3.8. We can easily see from Fig.3.8
that our scheme can detect the SYN flooding attack within just 3 observation periods (i.e.,
60 seconds) for the low-rate attack (7 SYN/sec), while it takes only 1 observation periods
(i.e., 20 seconds) to exceed the flooding threshold for the high-rate attack (15 SYN/sec).
On the other hand, the SYN-dog scheme can not detect the low-rate attack and takes
about 11 observation periods (i.e., 220 seconds) to detect the high-rate attack.
We further examined the detection sensitivity of the two schemes under the subnet and
mixed spoofing, and the corresponding results are summarized in Fig.3.9 and Fig.3.10,
respectively.
Fig.3.9 shows that in case of low-rate attack (7 syn/sec ) and the subnet spoofing, our
scheme can easily detect the attack in 3 observation time periods (i.e, 60 seconds) while it
takes 2 observation time periods (i.e, 40 seconds) to detect high-rate attack (15 syn/sec).
Also, we can easily see from Fig.3.10 that SYN-spoof takes 5 observation time periods to
detect 7 syn/sec flooding rate attack and takes 3 observation time periods to detect 15
syn/sec flooding rate attack under the mixed spoofing. On the other hand, the SYN-dog
can not detect low-rate and high-rate attacks at all, since its cumulative sum y(n) in the
subnet spoofing and the mixed spoofing is always zero there.
3.5.5 Detection Probability
To further study the performance of the the proposed scheme and the SYN-dog schemes,
we conducted the simulation on their detection probability2 for all the three traces with
different flooding rates and different types of IP spoofing. When the maximum allowed
2The probability that a scheme can successfully detect a flooding agent within a maximum allowed
detection time.
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Figure 3.8: Sensitivity under random spoofing
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Figure 3.9: Sensitivity under subnet spoofing
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Figure 3.10: Sensitivity under mixed spoofing
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Figure 3.11: The average detection probability
detection time was set as 10 minutes (i.e., the duration time of one attack) in all three
traces, the corresponding average detection probability of the SYN-spoof and SYN-dog
are summarized in Fig.3.11.
Fig.3.11 shows that our SYN-spoof scheme achieves significantly higher detection prob-
ability than the SYN-dog scheme especially for the low-rate attacks. For example, when
the flooding rate is 5 syn/sec, the average detection probability of SYN-spoof is more
than 30% while the average detection probability of SYN-dog is just 5%. We can also see
from Fig.3.11 that whenever the attack rate is above 15 syn/sec, our SYN-spoof scheme
can guarantee 100% detection probability within the duration time of one attack (i.e., 10
minutes here), while the corresponding detection probability of SYN-dog is only 36%.
The Fig.3.12 shows in more details the detection probability of the SYN-spoof under
three types of IP spoofing. This figure shows that the detection probability is always the
highest for random spoofing, the lowest for mixed spoofing and the moderate for subnet
spoofing. For example, when the flooding rate is as low as 10 syn/sec, the detection
probability is 100% under random spoofing, more than 55% under mixed spoofing and
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Figure 3.12: The detection probability of SYN-spoof under different types of IP spoofing
about 90% under subnet spoofing. We can also easily see from Fig.3.12 that whenever
the attack rate is above 15 syn/sec, our scheme can gurantee 100% detection probability
for different types of IP spoofing.
Fig.3.13 further shows the detection probability of SYN-spoof under different param-
eter settings in CUSUM module. We can see that the detection probability is the highest
for the setting of N=1 and a=1.8, and the parameter a can significantly affect the detec-
tion efficiency. For example, as a slightly increases from 1.8 to 2, the detection probability
for attack rate 3 syn/sec significantly decreases from 20% to 5%.
3.5.6 Average Detection Time
Finally, we examined the average detection time of SYN-spoof and SYN-dog in terms of
their average detection time periods 3. The comparison in Fig.3.14 demonstrates that the
average detection time of our scheme is much shorter than that of SYN-dog. For example,
when the flooding rate is 10 syn/sec, the average detection time periods of SYN-spoof is
3The average number of time periods used to successfully detect an attack
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Figure 3.13: The detection probability of SYN-spoof for different parameter setting
about 9.3 (or equivalently 9.3×20 = 186 seconds), but the average detection time periods
of SYN-dog is 23.5 (or 23.5× 20 = 470 seconds), which is over two times longer than our
SYN-spoof scheme.
The Fig.3.15 further shows the detection time of SYN-spoof under different types of IP
spoofing. Similar to the detection probability, we can see that our scheme always archives
the shortest detection time for random spoofing but the longest detection time for mixed
spoofing. For example, when the attack rate is low as 7 syn/sec, the average detection
time periods of SYN-spoof is about 3.3 periods under random spoofed, 19.2 periods under
subnet spoofed and 26.5 periods under mixed spoofed. We can also see from Fig.3.15 that
the average detection time for 15 syn/sec flooding rate attack is only 1 observation time
period for random spoofing, about 2.9 observation time periods for subnet spoofing and
5.2 observation time periods for mixed spoofing.
Fig.3.16 studies the average detection time of SYN-spoof under different parameter
settings. Similar to the detection probability, we can easily see that the average detection
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Figure 3.15: The average detection time of SYN-spoof under different types of IP spoofing
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Figure 3.16: The detection time of SYN-spoof for different parameter setting
time is the shortest for the setting of N=1 and a=1.8. For example, as a increases from
1.8 to 2, the average detection time for attack rate 15 syn/sec increases from 3 observation
time periods to 7.5 observation time periods.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a general scheme SYN-spoof for the efficient detection of
the flooding agents of the TCP SYN flooding attack under different types of IP spoofing.
We demonstrated through extensive trace-driven simulations that by first differentiating
a SYN/ACK packet as the first one or retransmission one and then considering two new
traffic features, the SYN-spoof scheme can always guarantee a very good detection sensi-
tivity to different types of IP spoofing. We found that the new scheme can significantly
outperform the available SYN-dog scheme in terms of detection probability and detection
time for both low-rate and high-rate flooding attacks.
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Chapter 4
Group Testing Based Detection of
Web Service DDoS Attackers
4.1 Introduction
The DDoS attackers launch the attack at the network layer to consume the network band-
width or at the application layer to attack the victim web servers. Since many effective
defense mechanisms have been proposed to protect the network from bandwidth attack,
recently the attackers target the application layer and establish a more sophisticated type
of DDoS attack to disable the legitimate clients from using this application.
There are two common methods to launch the DDoS flooding attack in web service
[67]. First, attackers can consume the victim web server by sending a query for large
amount of data. Second, attackers can cause the entire application to fail by overloading
the server with a huge number of requests as illustrated in Fig.4.1. We focus on the second
method because it is the most widely used method to launch the DDoS attack on web
service.
Recently, an efficient approach Live Baiting was proposed for detecting the identities
of DDoS attackers in web service based on the group testing theory [24]. Although Live
Baiting uses low state overhead without requiring either the models of legitimate requests
nor anomalous behavior, its detection algorithm has two limitations:
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Figure 4.1: Simple scenario of DDoS Attack.
• Clients activity: the detection algorithm assumes that all clients of the web service
are suspects during the detection interval even if some of them are inactive. Thus,
it leads to a high false positive probability especially for large web service with a
huge number of clients.
• Fixed threshold: the detection algorithm uses a fixed threshold based on the ex-
pected number of requests in each bucket during the detection interval without the
consideration of daily and weekly traffic variations. Therefore, the detection decision
is inaccurate and sensitive to site and access pattern.
In order to address the above limitations, we first consider the clients activity (Active
and Non-Active clients during the detection interval) and then propose a new adaptive
threshold based on the Change Point Detection, such that we can improve the false
positive probability and avoid the dependence of detection on sites and access patterns.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the related
work. In section 4.3, we briefly review the Live Baiting detection scheme and describe
its limitations. Section 4.4 describes our detection scheme in detail. Section 4.5 provides
66
the related performance evaluation and comparison. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes this
chapter.
4.2 Related Work
The available detection schemes for the DDoS attack like schemes in [68], [69] and [70]
focus on the detection of the attack rather than the identities of the attackers. The main
idea of these schemes is to periodically compare the current state of the system with a
model of normal system behavior, thus the attack traffic can be detected. While these
schemes are robust and simple, they can not provide any information about the IP address
of the attacker. Therefore, they need to rely on the expensive IP traceback mechanisms
for the detection of attackers. Also, these schemes detect the attack after the flooding
attack packets pass through the network and share the same paths as legitimate packets,
which significantly exhausts the network resources.
A few attacker detection schemes have been proposed so far to detect the identity
of the DDoS attackers in web service. The CAPATCHA mechanism[71] is now almost a
standard security mechanism for defending against attackers in websites. This mechanism
works through generating and grading a set of tests that are solvable by human, but
solving such tests usually beyond the capabilities of current computer programs. The
main disadvantage of CAPTCHAs is that it is not suitable for people with visual impair.
Also, users feel annoyed when they are interrupted by CAPTCHAs problems, which
always waste their time.
A session scheduling algorithm has been proposed proposed in [72] based on building
profiles for normal client behavior with respect to session inter-arrival times, request inter-
arrival times and session workload profile. This scheme detects the suspicious requests
based on the content of the requests, but it needs to keep state for each session, which
makes the detection scheme itself vulnerable to the DDoS attacks.
The honeypot scheme [73] works by baiting the attacker to install master or agent
code within the honeypot, thus masters or agents are trapped and their packets can be
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dropped. Honeypot scheme is effective in detecting hosts exploited by Internet worms.
It is notable, however, that honeypots are deployed on machines different than the ones
they are supposed to protect, so sophisticated attacks can avoid the honeypots.
4.3 Overview of Live Baiting
4.3.1 Live Baiting Architecture
It is notable that among the attacker detection schemes for web service proposed by now,
the live baiting scheme in [24] is the most promising one, because the number of states
needed by this scheme is in the order of number of attackers not the total number of
clients, which makes it scalable for large service with a huge client population. Also, this
scheme does not require modification inside the network, thus it is not expensive to apply.
Since the web service can be divided into classes (e.g, HTML, Images, Sound, Video,
...etc), so the maximum aggregate service capacity C (measured by req./sec.) of each
class is fixed under normal condition. Under the DDoS attack, however, the number of
request packets from the attackers will be significantly higher than the maximum capacity
of the service, because the attackers send a lot of request packets to the server at the same
time to overwhelm it and drop any incoming legitimate requests. Based on the previous
observation, the live baiting detection scheme uses the group testing theory [74] to detect
the identity of the attackers among clients of a public web service.
To detect the attackers of web service with total number of clients N using the group
testing theory, the live baiting scheme first divides the service class capacity (e.g Im-
ages) into a number of virtual servers, called buckets (T ). Then, design a binary group
testing matrix T ×N with rows corresponding to buckets and columns corresponding to
clients. According to this matrix, each client receiving tokens will send requests to his
corresponding buckets only.
The Fig.4.2 illustrates a simple example of web server with total N = 9 clients, the
server has aggregate capacity C = 9 req/sec and each legitimate client sends 1 req/sec.
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Two attackers d = 2 request the service at a high rate of 2 req/sec for each.
The live baiting first divides the server capacity into T = 6 buckets from A to F and
construct the 6 × 9 binary group testing matrix as shown in Fig.4.2(a). When a matrix
element at row i and column j is set to 1, this indicates that client j is assigned to bucket
i (e.g. client 1 is assigned to bucket A and E). Then, live baiting computes the threshold
called High Water Mark (HWM ) for the expected number of requests in each bucket
during the detection interval time as:
HWM =
C · P
T
(4.1)
where P is the length of detection interval. Let’s say that the detection interval in this
simple example is 10 sec, so the (HWM ) is 15. Finally, live baiting puts all clients in the
suspect list and counts the number of requests in each bucket. If the number of requests
in a bucket exceeds a threshold, its corresponding test result is labeled as positive (e.g.
bucket A and E), otherwise it is labeled as negative as shown in Fig.4.2(b).
The clients assigned to negative tests (i.e. buckets with number of requests less than
HWM) will be removed, so here clients 2,3,5,7,8,9 will be removed and the remaining
clients in the suspect list will be detected as attackers, so clients 1,4,6 will be detected as
attackers.
4.3.2 Limitations of the Available Detection Algorithm in Live
Baiting
The current detection algorithm of live baiting is quite simple to apply. However, it has
the following two limitations:
1. During each detection interval time, the detection algorithm in live baiting uses
a fixed threshold based on the expected number of requests in each bucket in the
detection interval. It is notable, however, that the number of requests in each bucket
may vary dramatically from time to time according to the clients activity. To make
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A 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
B 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
C 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
E 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
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(b) The current live baiting detection algorithm
Figure 4.2: Example of live biting with N=9 clients, T=6 tests and d=2 attackers
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the detection algorithm much more generally applicable and its deployment much
easier, it is necessary to use a detection method that is adaptive to daily and weekly
variations.
2. The detection algorithm adopted in live baiting starts with the assumption that
all clients are in the suspect list and for each negative test, it removes the clients
assigned to the corresponding bucket from the suspect list. Some legitimate clients
may be assigned to the same buckets of the attackers, so they will be detected as
attackers even if they do not send any request during the detection interval time.
This leads to a high false positive probability especially for large service with a huge
number of clients.
To illustrate the limitations of the detection algorithm adopted in the live baiting , we
still consider the simple example shown in Fig.4.2. In this example, the server can serve
9 clients, two of them are attackers (client 1 and client 4). During the detection interval
time, some clients are Non-Active (i.e. do not send requests), like 3, 6 and 9, and the
attackers send requests with higher rate than the legitimate clients, so their corresponding
buckets (bucket A and E) will exceeds the HWM.
In this example, the live baiting detects all attackers, so the false positive probability
is 0. Notice that, client 6 is detected as attacker even it is Non-Active during the detection
time, because it is assigned to the same buckets with attacker number 1 (i.e. buckets A
and E), thus the false positive probability is 1
9
. Therefore, the false positive probability
will increase dramatically in the current large web service with a huge number of clients,
which makes this detection algorithm not suitable for the large scale web service.
To address the above two limitations of the available detection algorithm, we propose
here a new detection algorithm.
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4.4 A New Detection Scheme
In this section, we first show the overall architecture of our new scheme for the detection
of flooding DDoS attackers in the web service, then we introduce in details its two main
modules, i.e. the Randomized Matrix Construction and the detection Algorithm.
The Fig.4.3 illustrates the flowchart of our proposed detection scheme inside one
bucket. The main idea of the proposed scheme is to first use the same randomized
construction algorithm like live baiting to generate the matrix used in the group testing.
Then, each client is assigned to one column in the matrix and is given a set of tokens, one
for each 1-bit in its column in the matrix. Rather than regarding all clients as suspects
during each detection interval, we regard only the active clients (client who send requests
during this interval time) as suspects and count their requests in each bucket. To make
the number of incoming requests in each bucket independent of the site and the access
patterns, this number is normalized by the average number of the incoming requests in
each bucket in the previous intervals. Finally, based on this normalized number of incom-
ing requests in each bucket, we propose a new adaptive threshold based on the Change
Point Detection method to make the detection decision.
4.4.1 Overall Detection Architecture
4.4.2 Randomized Matrix Construction
A non-adaptive group test algorithm with total N members, d estimate number of de-
fective members and T tests can be represented by a binary T × N matrix M in which
element (i, j) has entry 1 if and only if member j is contained in test i.
The authors in [75] presented a simple randomized non-adaptive group testing matrix
by setting each M(i, j) = 1 with probability 1
d+1
and excluding a non-defective member
if it participates in one test with a negative result. They proved that the algorithm can
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Figure 4.3: The flowchart of the new detection scheme inside one bucket.
detects all defective members with minimum false positive probability fp :
fp = (1−
1
d+ 1
(1−
1
d+ 1
)d)T (4.2)
From Equation (4.2), the number of tests T needed to achieve a false positive proba-
bility fp can be computed as [24]:
T =
log(fp)
log(1− 1
d+1
(1− 1
d+1
)d)
(4.3)
To apply the idea of randomized matrix for detecting DDoS attackers of web service,
we divide the aggregate server capacity for one service C into virtual buckets and map
these buckets to tests in the matrix M . Clients of the server are mapped into the matrix
columns and each client is given a number of secured tokens for each 1-bit in his corre-
sponding column [24]. Thus, each incoming request to the web server is marked with the
corresponding token containing the row index (bucket number) of its client. These tokens
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are renewed periodically (e.g. every day) for security. By this way, the server can drop
any spoofed request and each client is enforced to send his requests to his buckets only,
which make the detection more robust.
4.4.3 Detection Algorithm
The main function of the detection algorithm in the proposed detection scheme is to
first classify the clients of the web service to active and non active clients. Then, a new
adaptive threshold based on the change point detection method is applied to make the
detection decision.
Clients Activity
As described in Sect. 3.2 that in the real web service, some legitimate users who do not
send any requests during the detection time may still be detected as attackers if they
share the same buckets with attackers in the randomized matrix.
Since some clients may send requests and other clients may not send requests in
the same detection interval time, the first step in the proposed detection scheme is to
classify the clients to Active and Non-Active clients during each detection interval. By
this classification of clients during each detection interval time, only active members (not
all members as the live baiting scheme) will be in the suspect list. Thus, we can reduce
the false positive probability and make our scheme more efficient and generally applicable
for large web service with a huge number of clients.
For the example shown in Fig.4.2(b), all the clients are classified as active clients
except clients 3,6,9, because they do not send requests during the detection interval time.
Thus clients 1,4 will be detected as attackers and the false positive probability will be
zero.
Based on the the previous randomized matrix,in every detection interval n, the detec-
tion algorithm at the server works as follows:
1. Check the token of every received request packet and drop the request if it is not
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valid or comes from attacker already detected before (i.e client in the block list).
Otherwise:
• Classify this client as active member.
• Put the IP address of this client in the suspect list.
• Increment the corresponding bucket of this request by one.
2. Do Step 1) for any incoming request.
Notice that, the DDoS attackers overloading the server with a huge number of requests,
so they are always classified as active members during the attack time.
The Change Point Detection
The detection algorithm in live baiting uses a fixed threshold during each detection interval
time based on the expected number of requests in each bucket in the detection interval.
It is notable, however, that the number of requests in each bucket may vary dramatically
from time to time according to the clients activity. Therefore, we propose here a new
adaptive threshold based on the change point detection, such that we can avoid the
dependence of detection on sites and access patterns.
The change point detection method [64] is generally adopted to test if an observed
time series is statistically homogeneous. When a change occurs to a homogeneous series
(i.e., a sudden change from homogeneous to heterogeneous), the change point detection
can be used to efficiently determine the point in time when this change happens. The
main function of change point detection in our new scheme is to decide if a bucket contains
attacker, and if yes, to find the point in time when the attack happens.
Let X in denote the number of requests in bucket i within the detection interval n. To
eliminate the dependence of X in upon both the observation time and the number of active
clients in each bucket, X in should be normalized by the mean M
i
n of incoming requests
during an observation period. Let M¯ in denote the estimation of M
i
n based on the number
of requests in first n observation periods. Then the M¯ in can be estimated in real time
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and update periodically from the Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) of
previous measurements:
M¯ in = βM¯
i
n−1 + (1− β)X
i
n (4.4)
where β is the EMWA smoothing factor lying strictly between 0 and 1.
Define Y in = X
i
n − M¯
i
n−1, then X
i
n is independent of the weekly and daily variation in
each buckets. Thus, we can consider Y in as a stationary random process and its mean value
will change when the DDoS flooding attack occurs in the bucket. To detect the point in
time when such change in the mean value occurs in X in, we use the change point detection
based non parametric CUSUM algorithm [22], because the complexity of this algorithm
is very low and this algorithm fits our requirement of sequential and non-parametric test
for Y in.
Under normal operation, the mean value of Y in is zero (i.e M
i
n = 0). When the DDoS
attack occurs, however, the mean value of Y in in attacked buckets will become a large
positive value of M in. Since the values of M
i
n can not be known beforehand, it can be
approximated with αM in, where M
i
n can be adopted periodically using the exponential
weighted moving average and α is an amplitude percentage parameter of increase of the
mean rate after the attack has occurred.
Let
Y in = [Y
i
n−1 +
αM¯ in−1
σ2
+ (Xn − M¯
i
n−1 −
αM¯ in−1
2
)]+ (4.5)
where x+ equals to x if x > 0 and 0 otherwise. i.e., the maximum continuous increment
until time n. A large Y in is a strong indication of DDoS attack in the bucket i. Thus, we
can define the corresponding decision rule as [66]:
dN(Y
i
n) = I(Y
i
n > h), (4.6)
where h is the decision threshold and I(·) is the indicator function at observation period,
which gives value ‘1’ to indicate an attack and ‘0’ to indicate a normal condition.
If the value of Y in in bucket i exceeds the h value, its corresponding test is marked as
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positive. Otherwise, its corresponding test is marked as negative. Then, for each negative
test, we remove all clients assigned to these tests from the suspect list. Finally, the rest
of the suspect are detected as attackers and added to the block list.
4.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we investigate that as compared with the live baiting detection scheme
how much the detection efficiency and false positive probability can be further improved
by considering the clients activity and using the change point detection.
4.5.1 Simulation Environment
The performance evaluation was conducted by trace-driven simulation experiments, where
real web trace were adopted in our simulation. This trace contains two hours worth of
all HTTP requests to the tangthuvien forum WWW server [76]. The logs were collected
from 10:00:00 on Wednesday, January 14, 2009 through 12:00:00 on Wednesday, January
14, 2009. In our simulation, we use the image service class (gif, jpg, jpeg, xbm and bmp)
with aggregate request processing capacity C = 50 req./sec with total number of clients
N = 15000.
To study the performance of our new scheme under the DDoS attack, we conducted the
simulation by mixing the trace of normal traffics with the flooding traffic with aggregate
attack rates 150 req./sec, 200 req./sec and 300 req./sec with different number of attackers.
The simulation time of each run is 1000 sec and the attack started at 250 sec and ended at
750 sec. In our proposed scheme, we set the number of buckets T = 1000, thus randomized
non-adaptive group testing matrix is 1000×15000. The parameters we considered for the
change point detection are α = 0.5, h = 1, β = 0.98 and the detection interval time is
n = 20 sec.
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Figure 4.4: The dynamics of incoming requests packets
4.5.2 Detection Efficiency
We first examined the detection efficiency of both our scheme and the live baiting detection
scheme. In our simulation here, the attack rate is 200 req./sec, the number of attackers
x = 50 and the estimate number of attacker is d = 50 as well.
We summarize the dynamics of incoming request packets distribution in normal and
attack traffic in Fig.4.4. We can easily see from Fig.4.4 that the number of incoming
request packets significantly increase under the DDoS flooding attack during the attack
time (i.e. from t=250 sec to t=750 sec).
Fig.4.5 shows the number of dropped packets of incoming request packets after deploy-
ing the live baiting detection scheme and the new detection scheme when both of them
guarantee zero false negative probability. This figure shows clearly that the live baiting
detection scheme dropped more request packets than the proposed scheme even both of
them detected all the attackers. For example, at time t = 400 sec, the live baiting scheme
dropped more than 4100 request packets while the new proposed scheme dropped about
3850 request packets. We can also see from Fig.4.5 that the dropped request packets of the
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Figure 4.5: The dropped incoming requests packets after deploying the Live Baiting and
the New schemes
live baiting scheme at time t = 560 sec is more than 4300 request packets, while the the
dropped request packets of the new scheme is about 4000 request packets. This is because
the number of blocked legitimate clients of the proposed scheme is less than the blocked
legitimate clients of the live baiting scheme with the same false negative probability.
4.5.3 False Positive Probability
To further study the performance of the two schemes, we also conducted the simulation on
their false positive (FP ) probability when both of of them guarantee zero false negative
probability. The simulation was conducted with different number of attackers and different
attack rates 150 req./sec, 200 req/sec and 300 req/sec. The corresponding false positive
probability of both our new detection scheme and live baiting scheme are summarized in
Fig.4.6, Fig.4.7 and Fig.4.8 respectively.
Fig.4.6 shows the comparison of the false positive probability of the two detection
scheme when the attack rate was set as 150 req./sec. Fig.4.6 shows that our new scheme
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Figure 4.6: Attack rate 150 req/sec
achieves significantly lower false positive probability than the live baiting scheme espe-
cially for large scale service with high number of clients. Also, this figure shows that the
false positive probability of the live baiting scheme increases as the number of attackers
increase. For example, the new scheme succeed to detect 10 attackers with false positive
probability less than 0.003 while the false positive probability of live baiting is about
0.012. We can also easily see from the Fig.4.6 that when the number of attacker is 50, our
new scheme can guarantee about 0.003 false positive probability, while the live baiting
achieved 0.014 false positive probability.
We also compared the false positive probability of the two detection scheme under
attack rate 200 req/sec in Fig.4.7. We can easily see from Fig.4.7 that our scheme can
detect all 20 attackers with 0.003 false positive probability, while it achieved 0.0019 false
positive probability to detect all 100 attackers. On the other hand, the live baiting scheme
can achieved about 0.0119 and 0.0148 to detect 20 and 100 attackers respectively.
Fig.4.8 confirms the same results of Fig.4.6 and Fig.4.7. we can see clearly from this
figure that the proposed scheme always achieved lower false positive probability than
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the live baiting detection scheme under attack rate 300 req./sec with different number of
attackers. For example, the new scheme succeeds to detect 30 attackers with false positive
probability 0.004 while the false positive probability of live baiting is about 0.013. We can
also easily see from the Fig.4.7 that when the number of attacker is 100, our new scheme
can guarantee about 0.0038 false positive probability, while the live baiting achieved 0.02
positive probability.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we focus on the application-layer DDoS attack and proposed a new de-
tection scheme for web service DDoS attackers which can increase the detection efficiency
and significantly decrease the false positive probability in comparison with the available
detection scheme. Rather than putting all clients in the suspect list during the detection
interval time, we first classify the clients into active and non active clients and then use
an adaptive threshold based on the change point detection to make the final detection
decision in each bucket, such that we detect all the attackers of the web service with
low false positive and almost zero false negative. Simulation results demonstrate that by
adopting the new detection algorithm, we can greatly improve the detection efficiency.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary
In this dissertation we have proposed a group of effective defense schemes against dis-
tributed denial of service attacks (DDoS)in network-layer and application-layer. Our
research mainly introduces three defense schemes. First, source-end prevention scheme
for the flooding DDoS attacks which affect the network-ayer in the Internet. Second, de-
tection scheme for the flooding agents of the DDoS attacks under any type of IP spoofing.
Third, detection and mitigation scheme for web service DDoS attackers. For each of those
schemes, we provide novel contributions, which are supported with intensive mathemat-
ical analysis and extensive simulation studies. Precisely, our contributions as listed as
follows:
1. In chapter 2, we introduce an efficient scheme for filtering the spoofed IP packets
under different types of IP spoofing in the network-layer DDoS attack. We demon-
strated through analysis and extensive trace-driven simulations that by assigning a
key for each IP address in the stub network and then marking the outgoing request
of each flow by this key, the new scheme achieved two benefits. First, the proposed
scheme is general for filtering outgoing spoofed flows under any type of IP spoofing.
Second, the new scheme is suitable for the current high speed networks since it can
filter all the flow’s packets by verifying only its first request packet.
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2. In chapter 3, we still focus on the network-layer DDoS attacks and proposed a general
scheme for the efficient detection of the flooding agents of the TCP SYN flooding
attack. We demonstrated through extensive trace-driven simulations that by first
differentiating a SYN/ACK packet as the first one or retransmission one and then
considering two new traffic features, the SYN-spoof scheme can always guarantee a
very good detection sensitivity to different types of IP spoofing. We found that the
new scheme can significantly outperform the available SYN-dog scheme in terms of
detection probability and detection time for both low-rate and high-rate flooding
attacks.
3. In chapter 4, we focus on the application-layer DDoS attacks and proposed a new
detection scheme for web service DDoS attackers. This new scheme can increase
the detection efficiency and significantly decrease the false positive probability in
comparison with the available detection scheme. Rather than putting all clients in
the suspect list during the detection interval time, we first classify the clients into
active and non active clients and then use an adaptive threshold based on the change
point detection to make the final detection decision in each bucket, such that we
detect all the attackers of the web service with low false positive and almost zero
false negative. Simulation results demonstrate that by adopting the new detection
algorithm, we can greatly improve the detection efficiency.
5.2 Future Work
Undoubtedly, the DDoS attack is still one of the major threats to network security that
exhausts network bandwidth and resources. This dissertation is a step in an effort to-
wards designing more effective defense mechanisms for DDoS attacks in network-layer
and application-layer. In what follows, we address some future directions for the DDoS
defense mechanisms:
• As the first step, in this work we proposed a general router-based detection scheme
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for DDoS flooding agents with IP spoofing in chapter 3. In the future, it is quite
interesting to extend this work to be a complete defense mechanism against DDoS
attacks by filtering the attack packets after the detection.
• The proposed detection scheme for web service DDoS attackers in chapter 4 relies on
the assumption that clients have unique, un-spoofable IDs. While this assumption
can be maintained using application-level IDs, such as cookies, applying the scheme
to network-level attacks faces challenges. Therefore, our future work is to extend
this scheme to cover IP spoofing techniques.
• DDoS attacks are not only a serious threat for wired networks but also for wireless
infrastructures. Further work is though needed that combines well known security
drawbacks of wireless protocols with defense techniques that are already mature in
a wireless environment.
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